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Abstract
Legal action challenging a company’s advertisement for containing false or misleading state-
ments is a more recent development in the American legal system. The market’s utilization of
advertising to promote sales has grown steadily to the point where the frequency with which it
now permeates everyday life is almost constant. Lawsuits challenging many of these advertise-
ments have increased as well. The swelling influence of advertisements in the marketplace and the
complementary rise in false advertising litigation is relevant for both companies and consumers
alike. As litigation continues to grow as an outlet for companies to safeguard their brands, con-
sumers will find themselves jointly affected. This Note will analyze a subset of this area known as
false comparative advertising. A false comparative advertisement subjects a company targeted by
that advertisement to repeated injuries in the form of damage to reputation and loss of goodwill
until its broadcast is halted. As a result, before the underlying false advertisement claim is ever
argued, a plaintiff will first seek to preliminarily enjoin the defendant from broadcasting the ad-
vertisement. A court’s analysis of a motion for a preliminary injunction will involve four factors.
There is a judicially created practice that has long been recognized in this analysis that allows a
court to presume one of those factors. It essentially permits a court to presume irreparable harm,
one of the four factors, without the plaintiff producing supporting evidence. Naturally, it is called
the presumption of irreparable harm. The validity of the presumption is the next frontier facing
courts hearing false advertising cases. This Note will discuss the reasons why the presumption of
irreparable harm should continue to be recognized within the realm of false comparative advertis-
ing litigation.
KEYWORDS: Advertising, False Advertising, Comparative Law, Patent Law, Copyright, In-
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ABSTRACT 
Legal action challenging a company’s advertisement for containing 
false or misleading statements is a more recent development in the 
American legal system. The market’s utilization of advertising to 
promote sales has grown steadily to the point where the frequency 
with which it now permeates everyday life is almost constant. 
Lawsuits challenging many of these advertisements have increased 
as well. The swelling influence of advertisements in the marketplace 
and the complementary rise in false advertising litigation is relevant 
for both companies and consumers alike. As litigation continues to 
grow as an outlet for companies to safeguard their brands, 
consumers will find themselves jointly affected. This Note will 
analyze a subset of this area known as false comparative advertising. 
A false comparative advertisement subjects a company targeted by 
that advertisement to repeated injuries in the form of damage to 
reputation and loss of goodwill until its broadcast is halted. As a 
result, before the underlying false advertisement claim is ever 
argued, a plaintiff will first seek to preliminarily enjoin the 
defendant from broadcasting the advertisement. A court’s analysis of 
a motion for a preliminary injunction will involve four factors. There 
is a judicially created practice that has long been recognized in this 
analysis that allows a court to presume one of those factors. It 
essentially permits a court to presume irreparable harm, one of the 
four factors, without the plaintiff producing supporting evidence. 
Naturally, it is called the presumption of irreparable harm. The 
validity of the presumption is the next frontier facing courts hearing 
                                                                                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2016; B.S., Smeal College of 
Business, The Pennsylvania State University, 2013. I wish to express my sincere 
gratitude to Professor Caroline Gentile for her advice and guidance with this Note.  I 
would also like to give my thanks to my family and friends for their tremendous 
support. 
934 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XX 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
false advertising cases. This Note will discuss the reasons why the 
presumption of irreparable harm should continue to be recognized 
within the realm of false comparative advertising litigation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Never write an advertisement which you wouldn’t want your own 
family to read. You wouldn’t tell lies to your own wife. Don’t tell them 
to mine.”1 David Ogilvy, “The Father of Advertising,”2 emphasized the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. DAVID OGILVY, CONFESSIONS OF AN ADVERTISING MAN 99 (1st ed. 1963). 
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importance of truthful advertising in his landmark book Confessions of 
an Advertising Man.3 Years after Ogilvy issued his ethical stance, the 
law prohibiting false advertisements started to take shape.4 Thus far, the 
litigation of advertising claims has provided a robust collection of cases 
that emphasize how relevant the development of this field is to the 
market. 
In 1991, Castrol, the world leading manufacturer, distributor, and 
marketer of motor oil, filed a false advertising claim against Quaker 
State, another leading company in the business of motor oil.5 A Quaker 
State commercial claimed that its motor oil protected car engines better 
than any other leading motor oil.6 In reality, the tests that Quaker State 
used to corroborate its advertising claims did not prove that its motor oil 
was superior.7 As a result, the district court issued a preliminary 
injunction preventing Quaker State from making the superiority claim, 
and the order was subsequently affirmed by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit.8 
In 1998, the Clorox Company (“Clorox”), which produces the well-
known chlorine-based liquid bleach called Clorox, filed a lawsuit 
against Proctor & Gamble (“P&G”), the familiar household products 
company.9 P&G had implemented an advertising campaign in Puerto 
Rico to promote its laundry detergent Ace.10 The goal of the campaign 
was to change the prevailing consumer perception in Puerto Rico that 
laundry detergent alone would be insufficient to get clothes white, and 
that chlorine bleach would be needed.11 P&G claimed that by simply 
using Ace, consumers would be able to achieve clothes as white or 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Constance L. Hays, David Ogilvy, Father of Soft Sell in Advertising, Dies, N.Y. 
Times, July 22, 1999, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/22/business/david-
ogilvy-88-father-of-soft-sell-in-advertising-dies.html. 
 3. See OGILVY, supra note 1. 
 4. See Arthur Best, Controlling False Advertising: A Comparative Study of Public 
Regulation, Industry Self-Policing, and Private Litigation, 20 GA. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1985) 
(noting that advertising regulation was still in its infancy at the time the article was 
published). 
 5. See Castrol, Inc. v. Quaker State Corp., 977 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 6. See id. at 59. 
 7. See id. at 64-65. 
 8. See id. at 65-66. Part I of this Note will discuss the use of preliminary 
injunctions in a false comparative advertising claim. 
 9. See Clorox Co. P.R. v. Proctor & Gamble Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 29-30 
(1st Cir. 2000). 
 10. See id. at 28. 
 11. See id. 
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whiter than if they used another detergent combined with chlorine 
bleach.12 Clorox sought a preliminary injunction on its claim that P&G 
was engaging in false advertising based on evidence that chlorine bleach 
was the most effective at bringing out the white in clothes.13 Although 
the district court initially dismissed the case, on appeal, the First Circuit 
determined that Clorox had properly alleged a false advertisement claim 
and remanded its preliminary injunction motion.14 
More recently, Time Warner Cable (“TWC”), the second largest 
American cable provider at the time of the lawsuit, filed a lawsuit 
against DIRECTV, one of the largest American direct broadcast satellite 
providers.15 DIRECTV launched an advertising campaign based on the 
theme of “SOURCE MATTERS,” which attempted to persuade 
consumers that DIRECTV delivered a better picture and sound than 
cable. Among other multimedia advertisements efforts, DIRECTV 
recruited celebrities Jessica Simpson and William Shatner to advocate 
this claim in a series of commercials.16 Simpson reprised her role as 
Daisy Duke from The Dukes of Hazzard and Shatner revived Captain 
Kirk from Star Trek to the delight of many fans, TWC not being one of 
them.17 In response, TWC initiated legal action against DIRECTV for its 
advertising campaign claims.18 The facts showed that there was no 
difference between the picture and sound consumers received from 
DIRECTV’s service and that which they received from cable.19 As a 
result, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court order preliminarily 
enjoining the aspects of DIRECTV’s campaign that made the superior 
claims.20 
                                                                                                                 
 12. In conjunction with its advertising campaign, P&G used the slogan “Whiter is 
not possible,” to promote Ace. See id. at 28-29. After the initial complaints from 
Clorox, P&G modified its campaign inviting consumers to, “compare with your 
detergent,” before the phrase, “whiter is not possible.” See id. 
 13. See id. at 28. 
 14. See id. at 39. 
 15. This lawsuit provides a key example of the relevancy of these claims to the 
everyday consumer. See Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 
148-49 (2d Cir. 2007). This case will be discussed in more detail in Part II of this Note. 
 16. See id. at 149-50. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. at 149-51. 
 19. See id. at 149. 
 20. The preliminary injunction was affirmed in part for the aspects of the 
DIRECTV campaign that were properly challenged. See id. at 163. This included the 
2015] KEEPING THE STATUS QUO 937 
Motor oil, laundry detergent, and television services provide 
examples of how false advertising litigation can arise in any industry.21 
In many industries, false comparative advertising is still common.22 
Companies therefore need to remain vigilant in monitoring the 
development of this legal field so that they can readily identify 
competitor false advertising.23 This is especially important because the 
companies involved in the aforementioned cases are household names, 
demonstrating just how closely connected these disputes are to the 
everyday consumer.24 Its prevalence is the reason the developments in 
this practice area are significant for both corporations and consumers.25 
This Note will examine one of the current debates in false 
advertising claims: the disagreement regarding the use of the 
presumption of irreparable harm, a judicially created practice used in the 
equitable relief analysis for preliminary injunctions. Part I of this Note 
will examine false advertisement claims and the development of the 
presumption. Part I will include a comparison to patent infringement 
claims and copyright infringement claims, fields that saw a similar 
development of the presumption. Part II will discuss the abolition of the 
presumption in patent and copyright litigation. The rejection of the 
presumption in these fields has led to confusion between courts over 
whether it should still be recognized in false advertising litigation.26 Part 
II will therefore introduce the conflicting views that have arisen as a 
result of this confusion. Part III will advocate for the continuing 
                                                                                                                 
Simpson and Shatner advertisements, but some of its other efforts fell outside of the 
scope of a proper false advertisement claim. See id. at 162-63. 
 21. See Time Warner, 497 F.3d at 148-49; Clorox Co. P.R. v. Proctor & Gamble 
Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2000); Castrol, Inc. v. Quaker State 
Corp., 977 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 22. See generally Lee Goldman, The World’s Best Article on Competitor Suits for 
False Advertising, 45 Fla. L. Rev. 487 (1993) (discussing the competing views on the 
incentives a company has to engage in false advertising). 
 23. See Part I.A for a discussion of the development of the presumption of 
irreparable harm. See Part II for a discussion of the changing view on the use of the 
presumption. 
 24. See Time Warner, 497 F.3d 144; Clorox Co. P.R., 228 F.3d 24; Castrol, Inc., 
977 F.2d 57. 
 25. See infra notes 39-49 and accompanying text (explaining the interests that false 
advertising law is designed to protect). 
 26. See infra Part II.C (introducing cases from the federal courts of appeal that 
discussed the validity of the presumption of irreparable harm in false advertising 
claims). 
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recognition of the presumption in false comparative advertising claims 
in order to protect the marketplace. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRESUMPTION OF IRREPARABLE HARM IN 
FALSE ADVERTISING, PATENT INFRINGEMENT, AND COPYRIGHT 
INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS 
Preliminary injunctions provide a fundamental remedy to a 
corporate plaintiff in false advertising, patent infringement, and 
copyright infringement claims.27 A preliminary injunction returns the 
dispute to the status quo by freezing a defendant’s questionable 
activities during litigation.28 It is an extraordinary remedy and should 
never be awarded as a right.29 But it is also a vital remedy that 
companies almost always rely upon in false advertisement, patent 
infringement, and copyright infringement claims.30 For a company to 
obtain a preliminary injunction, it must establish four factors: (1) the 
company is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) failure to obtain 
preliminary relief will likely cause the company to suffer irreparable 
injury, (3) the balance of equities tips in the company’s favor, and (4) an 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See infra notes 51-55, 83-85, 104-106 and accompanying text (explaining how 
the statutory regulations respective to each area of law provides plaintiffs the ability to 
seek a preliminary injunction). 
 28. Status quo is defined as the “last, peaceable, noncontested status of the parties.” 
See 5 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 30:50 
(4th ed. 2014). 
 29. A court is advised to take a cautious approach when making a ruling on a 
motion for a preliminary injunction. This is rooted in protecting the defendant from 
unfair treatment. See id. § 30:30. 
 30. Compare James E. Clevenger, 44 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 3d 1 False 
Advertising Under Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B) § 22 (1997) (“It is relatively common 
practice in false advertising cases to seek the entry of a preliminary injunction at an 
early stage in the litigation. This is to prevent the continuance of public confusion or 
deception being caused by the false advertising [.]”), with Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes 
Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that “[w]ithout this 
injunctive power of the courts, the right to exclude granted by the patent would be 
diminished, and the express purpose of the Constitution and Congress, to promote the 
progress of the useful arts, would be seriously undermined”), abrogated by eBay, Inc. 
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006), as recognized in Robert Bosch, 
LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1148-49 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and 6 William F. 
Patry, Patry on Copyright § 22:7 (noting the importance of injunctive relief in copyright 
infringement claims). 
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injunction is in the public interest.31 The traditional principles of equity 
require that a plaintiff demonstrate each of these factors.32 The court has 
equitable discretion to grant or deny injunctive relief after a fair 
weighing of each of the factors.33 
In each of these practice areas, the preliminary injunction analysis 
has carried with it a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm, a 
judicial tool that shifts the burden for the second factor of the analysis to 
the defendant.34 Part I will examine the origin of these causes of action 
and how the nature of these claims led courts to adopt a presumption of 
irreparable harm. Part I.A will focus on false advertising claims, Part I.B 
will focus on patent infringement claims, and Part I.C will focus on 
copyright infringement claims. 
A. THE FALSE COMPARATIVE ADVERTISEMENT CLAIM 
A company engages in false comparative advertising when it 
broadcasts an advertisement to the marketplace that contains false or 
misleading claims about another company.35 Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act provides a sword for the targeted company to wield against 
those false advertisements.36 More specifically, the statute creates a 
federal cause of action for that company by imposing civil liability on an 
entity that has falsely advertised.37 When a targeted company is, or 
believes it is likely to be, damaged by the representations made in those 
advertisements, it can properly bring a section 43(a) action against the 
company responsible.38 
Allowing a company to invoke section 43(a) to defend itself against 
false advertisements is grounded in two fundamental purposes. First, the 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); eBay,   
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 32. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See infra notes 56, 88, 108 and accompanying text (noting that each practice 
area concurrently developed this presumption as a procedural tool for judges to use 
when considering the need for equitable relief). 
 35. False advertising is “an advertising statement that tends to mislead consumers 
about . . . one’s own or someone else’s goods, services, or commercial activity.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (10th ed. 2014). 
 36. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1)(B) (2012) (although the governing standard for 
false advertisement is still commonly referred to as section 43(a), it has since been 
codified in the United State Code). 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. 
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statute seeks to protect the commercial interests of a company targeted 
by a false advertisement.39 That company stands to suffer loss of sales, 
damage to business reputation, and loss of goodwill because the false 
advertisements will operate to form a false perception about a targeted 
company in the mind of the consumer.40 Second, the statute seeks to 
protect against consumer deception.41 Failure to eliminate the false 
advertisement from the marketplace prolongs consumer exposure to the 
false perception.42 Allowing the company responsible for the false 
advertisement to continue to broadcast the false or misleading claims 
only increases its reach and creates a greater risk of injury to the 
targeted company’s commercial interests.43 Thus, by promoting a 
marketplace that allows consumers to make purchasing decisions on the 
basis of truthful information rather than false perceptions, section 43(a) 
works to protect innocent consumers, in addition to the targeted 
company.44 Further, the statute guarantees that companies will advance 
                                                                                                                 
 39. The purpose is “to protect persons engaged in . . . commerce against unfair 
competition.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012); see also Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1389 (2014) (“Identifying the interests protected by the 
Lanham Act . . . requires no guesswork, since the Act includes an ‘unusual, and 
extraordinarily helpful,’ detailed statement of the statute’s purposes.”) (citing Halicki 
Prods. v. United Artists Commc’ns, Inc. 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 40. Today, it is universally understood that false advertising protects against these 
injuries. See Lexmark Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1393 (“[L]ost sales and damage to . . . business 
reputation—are injuries [that are] precisely the sorts of commercial interests the 
[Lanham] Act protects.”). 
 41. Although the commercial interests of companies that are targeted by false 
advertisements suffer from such false or misleading claims, it is the consumer who is 
the real victim. On a day-to-day basis, consumers must rely on advertiser-honesty to 
ensure that the information included in the advertisements they see are truthful. With 
the bulk of company information coming through advertisements, advertisers have been 
able to create specific brand perceptions, whether truthful or dishonest. It is the 
dishonest perceptions that false advertising law seeks to prevent. See Jean Wegman 
Burns, Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under the Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L. 
REV. 807, 874-75 (1999) (“[T]he key purpose of any false advertising law is to ensure 
that consumers receive accurate information[.]”). 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See Conopco, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 95 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(“[T]he public interest underlying the Lanham Act’s prohibition of misleading 
advertisement is that of preventing consumer confusion or deception. This interest is 
identical to the public’s interest in protecting against trademark infringement.”); 
McCarthy, supra note 28, § 27:25 (citing Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 
F.2d 272, 277 (2d Cir. 1981) (“We are therefore reluctant to accord the language of s 
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both purposes because in protecting its own commercial interests, a 
company automatically guards against consumer deception.45 
Accordingly, any relief a consumer receives is directly tied to a 
company’s success in its claim.46 Conversely, the Lanham Act does not 
operate to protect the interests of the advertiser.47 Allowing an advertiser 
to have blanket discretion in what it communicates to the marketplace 
does not serve any public policy.48 In fact, granting blanket discretion 
would not only undercut the precise company actions that the Lanham 
Act is designed to protect, but would also foster an untruthful market. 
Therefore, after balancing these interests, the Lanham Act is supremely 
committed to protecting the targeted company and its consumers.49 
The Lanham Act provides extensive relief to a company that is 
targeted by false comparative advertising.50 A company’s first 
opportunity to seek remedial help comes in the infancy of litigation in 
the form of a preliminary injunction.51 In the absence of injunctive 
relief, the marketplace would be subject to infiltration by false and 
deceptive messages thereby undermining the Lanham Act’s policy 
goals.52 As a result, this remedy protects a company from further injury 
                                                                                                                 
43(a) a cramped construction, lest rapid advances in advertising and marketing methods 
outpace technical revisions in statutory language and finally defeat the clear purpose of 
Congress in protecting the consumer.”)). 
 45. Section 43(a) is something of an oddity as consumers have no standing to sue 
under the statute yet the statute is designed to protect their interests. See Lexmark Int’l, 
134 S. Ct. at 1390 (“A consumer who is hoodwinked into purchasing a disappointing 
product may well have an injury-in-fact cognizable under Article III, but he cannot 
invoke the protection of the Lanham Act[.]”). 
 46. See McCarthy, supra note 28. 
 47. See David H. Bernstein & John Cerreta, eBay & the Presumption of 
Irreparable Harm in Lanham Act False Advertising Cases, 27 THE COMPUTER & 
INTERNET LAW., no. 11, at 25. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. at 29 (explaining that the “weighty interests of both plaintiffs and the 
public” in a false advertisement suit deserve heightened protection compared to the 
limited value in recognizing the advertiser’s interests in “continuing to disseminate 
misleading claims”). 
 50. The Lanham Act allows a plaintiff to recover the defendant’s profits, any 
damages the plaintiff has incurred, costs of the action, and attorney fees after 
establishing a violation of section 43(a). See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2012). The Lanham Act 
also expressly authorizes a court to enjoin the false advertisement. See 15 U.S.C. § 
1116. 
 51. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116. 
 52. See Bernstein & Cerreta, supra note 47, at 29 (“To deny injunctive relief after a 
finding of false advertising would only allow the deception to ‘continue to seep into the 
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that it would otherwise suffer throughout the life of the case.53 This 
simultaneously protects consumers by preventing the perpetuation of the 
false perceptions the advertiser is hoping to relay to those consumers.54 
Accordingly, preliminary injunctive relief has become the remedy that 
most effectively safeguards the market.55 
Toward the end of the twentieth century, courts hearing false 
advertising claims gradually stopped requiring plaintiffs to prove the 
second factor of the preliminary injunctive analysis, opting instead to 
grant preliminary injunctions based on the presumption that failure to 
enjoin advertisers from their alleged misconduct would cause the target 
company irreparable harm.56 This development followed from a 
collective acknowledgment of the effect that false comparative 
advertising has on those targeted companies.57 Advertisements are 
                                                                                                                 
public’s discourse,’ thus ‘undermin[ing], rather than promot[ing], the Lanham Act’s 
goal of protecting consumers.’”) (citing PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., No. 
3:09-CV-269, 2010 WL 957756, at *3 (E.D. VA. Mar. 12, 2010)). 
 53. Preliminary injunctions have the ability to “prevent irreparable injury to legal 
rights in light of a prediction of the final outcome of the case.” John Leubsdorf, The 
Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 565 (1978). They serve to 
“stop the bleeding,” and can be a useful tool to prevent any further damage that has 
already been done. See Jeffery M. Sanchez, The Irreparably Harmed Presumption? 
Why the Presumption of Irreparable Harm in Trademarks Will Survive eBay and 
Winter, 2011 BYU L. REV. 535, 535 (2011). 
 54. See Bernstein & Cerreta, supra note 47. 
 55. See Goldman, supra note 22, at 492 (“[I]f truthful informative advertising is an 
unequivocal social good, false advertising is unequivocally bad. In the short run, 
deceptive advertising injures consumers and competitors. In the long run, false 
advertising results in a reduction of product quality and misallocation of resources. If 
left unchecked, deceptive advertising may eventually undermined the entire competitive 
system.”). Moreover, preliminary injunctions are extremely important in protecting the 
market interests because of the lengthy process of the American judicial system. As of 
2013, the median time interval from filing to disposition of a civil case in which trial 
was completed by U.S. District Courts was just over two years. See Judicial Facts and 
Figures 2013: Combined Civil and Criminal, U.S. District Courts, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialFactsandFigures/judicial-facts-figures-
2013.aspx. 
 56. See Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 211 F.3d 515, 522 (10th Cir. 2000); Porous Media 
Corp. v. Pall Corp., 110 F.3d 1329, 1335-36 (8th Cir. 1997); Southland Sod Farms v. 
Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1146 (9th Cir. 1997); Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson 
& Co., 971 F.2d 6, 16 (7th Cir. 1992); McNeilab, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 848 
F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 57. There has been disagreement among courts on the proper section of when it 
should apply. See N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1227 
2015] KEEPING THE STATUS QUO 943 
designed to generate a specific message for the consumer, and more 
often than not the advertisements reach the target audience.58 When a 
company broadcasts a false advertisement, it logically follows that the 
falsity has reached the consumer.59 
There are two types of false advertisements: “(1) ‘misleading, non-
comparative commercials which tout[] the benefits of the products 
advertised but ma[k]e no direct reference to any competitor’s product,’ 
and (2) ‘a false comparative advertising claim.’”60 Non-comparative 
advertisements “accrue[] equally to all competitors” in the market so 
“some indication of actual injury and causation,” is necessary to prevent 
speculation.61 In contrast, a false comparative advertisement necessarily 
results in irreparable harm because it diminishes the value of the 
targeted company’s product or service in the mind of the consumer.62 
This recognition prompted courts to adopt the presumption of 
irreparable harm in false comparative advertisement claims upon a 
plaintiff’s successful showing of the first factor in the equitable relief 
analysis.63 Nevertheless, the presumption is rebuttable, in that it is 
                                                                                                                 
(11th Cir. 2008) (indicating that some district courts employ language that might 
indicate a broader application of the presumption to both false comparative 
advertisements and false non-comparative advertisements, but characterizing that use as 
improper); see also Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 273 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(comparing the two types of false advertisements that have seen the use of the 
presumption); Bernstein & Cerreta, supra note 47 (noting that some courts have limited 
the presumption to false comparative advertisement claims while other courts have 
endorsed the expanded view and urge plaintiffs to seek the presumption in all false 
advertising litigation). Cognizant of the broad scope of advertising messages that give 
rise to a section 43(a) claim, some courts have restricted the use of the presumption to 
disputes involving comparative advertisements. Where non-comparative advertising is 
concerned, the presumption’s rationale loses merit because the connection between the 
advertisement and damage is suspect. A competitor misleading consumers about its 
product is not necessarily damaging to another competitor’s reputation or goodwill. 
See, e.g., Castrol, Inc., 977 F.2d at 62; McNeilab, Inc., 848 F.2d at 38. 
 58. See McNeilab, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 501 F. Supp. 517, 530 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
 59. See id. 
 60. See Merck Eprova AG v. Gnosis S.p.A., 760 F.3d 247, 259 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(citing McNeilab, Inc., 848 F.2d at 38). 
 61. See McNeilab, Inc., 848 F.2d at 38. 
 62. See id. 
 63. If a plaintiff can establish likely success on the merits of the case, or, in other 
words, that the defendant has likely engaged in false advertising, then a court would be 
within its power to presume that irreparable harm is going to result from that conduct. 
See Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 211 F.3d 515, 522 (10th Cir. 2000); Porous Media Corp. v. 
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merely a burden shifting mechanism allowing the defendant to produce 
evidence refuting the existence of irreparable harm.64 Following a 
determination on the presumption, the court must complete the equitable 
analysis by fairly balancing each of the four preliminary injunction 
factors.65 
The use of the presumption has been further justified by the innate 
difficulty in establishing irreparable harm in false advertising 
litigation.66 A company’s loss of sales is not wholly attributable to a 
competitor’s false advertisement because of a variety of factors that 
affect a company’s top line.67 Therefore, the use of loss of sales as a 
benchmark for establishing irreparable injury is speculative and 
inconsistent.68 Likewise, “it is virtually impossible to ascertain the 
precise economic consequences of intangible harms, such as damage to 
reputation and loss of goodwill, caused by [Lanham Act] violations.”69 
The fact that a plaintiff would be required to prove by some metric the 
existence of these injuries at an early stage of litigation only exacerbates 
the difficulty of being successful.70 The presumption alleviates these 
                                                                                                                 
Pall Corp., 110 F.3d 1329, 1335-36 (8th Cir. 1997); Southland Sod Farms v. Stover 
Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1146 (9th Cir. 1997); Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 
971 F.2d 6, 16 (7th Cir. 1992); McNeilab, Inc., 848 F.2d at 38. 
 64. See Abbott Labs., 971 F.2d at 18. 
 65. See id. (“Finding that . . . injuries are irreparable only would mean that [the 
plaintiff] has cleared the second preliminary injunction threshold; the wisdom of 
granting preliminary relief would then depend upon the discretionary weighing of all 
four preliminary injunction factors.”). 
 66. See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (indicating that the harm that 
results from false advertising is intangible, and, as such, cannot readily be identified). 
 67. Change in price points, public relations, and new market entrants are a few 
examples of the many market variables that influence the fluctuation of a company’s 
sales. The presence of these market variables makes the use of loss of sales a 
speculative injury. See generally Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 
186 (2d Cir. 1980) (providing a practical look at how a court will determine whether a 
company has in fact suffered loss of sales). 
 68. See id. 
 69. See Abbott Labs., 971 F.2d at 16. 
 70. Ascertaining these injuries at a later stage of litigation is difficult itself. See id. 
Further, pressuring the plaintiff to demonstrate the effects of an advertisement on its 
reputation and goodwill with even less time simply increases the difficulty. See 
Bernstein & Cerreta, supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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concerns for a plaintiff and plugs the gap that otherwise would be very 
difficult to fill.71 
B. THE PATENT INFRINGEMENT CLAIM 
Patent infringement occurs when a company elects to make, use, 
offer for sale, or sell the patented invention of another company.72 The 
Patent Act creates a federal right of action when patent infringement 
occurs.73 The right granted to a company by a patent is “the right to 
exclude” a competitor from appropriating its patent.74 If a company has 
a valid patent and a competitor has infringed upon that right, it can seek 
redress by taking legal action against that competitor.75 
The justification for the creation of patent law is derived from the 
“Science” prong of the United States Constitution’s explicit grant of 
authority to the federal government to promote the “Arts and 
Sciences.”76 Congress carried out this task by awarding patents to 
inventors.77 Patent rights promote innovation by promising inventors the 
exclusive right to enjoy the fruits of their labor.78 This incentivizes 
inventors to place their products into the market.79 In turn, consumers 
are able to enjoy the increased flow of technological developments into 
the marketplace.80 Patent law therefore strikes a balance between 
rewarding inventors for investing time and money to develop new 
                                                                                                                 
 71. See Bernstein & Cerreta, supra note 47, at 28 (noting that “[t]he presumption 
also has the effect of making provisional relief a more viable option for plaintiffs in 
false advertising cases”). 
 72. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. § 154. 
 75. See id. 
 76. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 77. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
 78. Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1372 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007). 
 79. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., 610 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d 
Cir. 1979) (“The purpose of [a patent] . . . is to provide an incentive for private 
enterprise to devote resources to innovative research, to make the investments required 
to put new inventions into practice, and to make the benefits of the invention available 
to a wider public.”). 
 80. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (“First, patent 
law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it promotes disclosure of inventions, 
to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public to practice the invention once 
the patent expires; third, the stringent requirements for patent protection seek to assure 
that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the public.”). 
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technologies and satisfying the public’s interest in obtaining access to 
that innovation.81 The schematics of patent law provide the proper 
incentives to foster a competitive market by maintaining this balance 
between incentivizing innovations and captivating the public interest 
with the prospect of cutting-edge technological developments.82 
In order to uphold the interests underlying patent law, the Patent 
Act affords an avenue of legal recourse for a plaintiff whose patent has 
been infringed.83 Similar to false advertising, a plaintiff can seek 
preliminary injunctive relief to enjoin the defendant’s use of the patent.84 
A preliminary injunction protects the exclusive rights of an inventor for 
the duration of the litigation, thereby upholding the public policy 
underlying patent laws.85 Specifically, patent holders’ ability to enjoin 
infringers during the early stages of litigation affords the holders the 
opportunity for full enjoyment and protection of their patent rights 
without undue delay.86 
In patent infringement litigation, the equitable analysis for 
preliminary injunctions is identical to the analysis employed in false 
advertising claims.87 Courts began to recognize a presumption of 
irreparable harm for patent infringement claims around the same time 
courts recognized this presumption in false advertisement claims.88 The 
rationale underlying this development when assessing claims of patent 
                                                                                                                 
 81. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) 
(“From their inception, the federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance 
between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and 
refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very 
lifeblood of a competitive economy.”). 
 82. See id. 
 83. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
 84. See id. 
 85. A patent holder has a clear interest in protecting the right granted by patent 
during litigation instead of waiting for a final judgment on the merits especially given 
the average length of civil litigation. See U.S. District Courts, supra note 55. 
 86. See Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (indicating the importance of preliminary injunctive relief in patent infringement 
claims), abrogated by eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006), 
as recognized in Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1148-49 
(Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 87. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 88. The presumption in patent law developed toward the end of the twentieth 
century and witnessed a rise in prominence during the same time it experienced a 
similar rise in false advertising law. See Smith Int’l, 718 F.2d at 1573. 
2015] KEEPING THE STATUS QUO 947 
infringement was grounded in the understanding that once infringement 
on a valid patent has been established, the exclusive right attached to 
that patent is undoubtedly impaired.89 Accordingly, if a plaintiff makes a 
clear showing of patent validity and infringement, a court will presume 
irreparable injury.90 Nevertheless, it is not the case that every patent 
infringement injury is irreparable given that it often can be compensated 
by money damages.91 It is only when monetary relief is insufficient for 
the resulting harm that it will be irreparable.92 Regardless of the 
possibility of money damages, the presumption became a consistent 
feature of preliminary injunctive review in all patent infringement 
disputes.93 
C. THE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CLAIM 
A copyright grants the creator of an original work that is fixed in a 
tangible medium the exclusive right to use and distribute that work.94 
Copyright infringement occurs when another company or person uses or 
                                                                                                                 
 89. See id. at 1581 (explaining with regard to the irreparable harm analysis, “[t]he 
very nature of the patent right is the right to exclude others. Once the patentee’s patents 
have been held to be valid and infringed, he should be entitled to the full enjoyment and 
protection of his patent rights. The infringer should not be allowed to continue his 
infringement in the face of such a holding.”). 
 90. See id. (“We hold that where validity and continuing infringement have been 
clearly established . . . immediate irreparable harm is presumed. To hold otherwise 
would be contrary to the public policy underlying patent laws.”); see also Roper Corp. 
v. Litton Sys., Inc., 757 F.2d 1266, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The presumption rests on a 
strong showing that a valid patent is being infringed. When that is true, irreparable 
injury may be presumed. When, as here, infringement is neither actually occurring nor 
is reasonably likely, the basis and need for the presumption crumbles.”). 
 91. See Douglas Lichtman, Irreparable Benefits, 116 YALE L.J. 1284, 1288 (2007) 
(noting that “[p]atent harms are not literally irreparable—most patent-related injuries 
can be fully compensated by some ex post cash payment—but they are typically 
deemed irreparable because patent harms are difficult for courts to value”). 
 92. See id. 
    93. The Federal Circuit established a precedent for district courts over the valid use 
of the presumption of irreparable harm when it endorsed the presumption first in Smith, 
and then in later cases, continuing to reiterate its validity. See Polymer Techs., Inc. v. 
Bridwell, 103 F.3d 970, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Roper Corp., 757 F.2d at 1272. The 
Federal Circuit ultimately declined to recognize the presumption in Robert Bosch. See 
Robert Bosch, 659 F.3d 1142. 
 94. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (listing the various uses of a copyright that are 
exclusively granted to the owner). 
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distributes that work without authorization.95 The Copyright Act grants a 
federal right of action for copyright owners, who properly register their 
copyrights, to protect their intellectual property against infringers.96 If a 
company owns a valid copyright and a competitor has copied the 
original elements of the copyrighted work, the company can enforce its 
exclusive right by initiating litigation against that competitor.97 
The basis for the development of copyright law is derived from the 
same provision of the Constitution that warrants the creation of patent 
law.98 Copyrights fall under the “Arts” prong of the federal 
government’s authority to promote the “Arts and Sciences.”99 On the 
surface, copyright protection is aimed at providing a “fair return for an 
‘author’s’ creative labor.”100 However, this return is a stepping-stone to 
achieve the overriding purpose of copyrights: the stimulation of artistic 
creativity for the benefit of society.101 As a result, copyrights are an 
efficient way to promote the fairness that is owed to those creators of 
original works while fostering a more diverse collection of works for the 
public good.102 Copyright law therefore seeks to maintain the balance 
between the interests of artists and the interests of the public in order to 
advance the constitutional goals of promoting the “Arts.”103 
In order to uphold the interests underlying copyright law, the 
Copyright Act provides remedies to those who have been subject to 
                                                                                                                 
 95. See id. § 501. 
 96. See id. Although a common-law copyright exists, the presumption of 
irreparable harm developed in federal courts, which can only hear those claims that are 
supported by a valid federal copyright registration. This Note focuses on those federal 
claims. See Catherine Palo, 77 Am. Jur. Trials 449, Copyright Infringement      
Litigation § 3 (2000). 
 97. See, e.g., Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
 98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 99. See id. 
 100. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 
(1984). 
 101. See id. (“But the ultimate aim is . . . to stimulate artistic creativity for the 
general public good.”). 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. at 431-32 (“The limited scope of the copyright holder’s statutory 
monopoly . . . reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative 
work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve 
the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other 
arts.”). 
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infringement.104 Preliminary injunctions are again the first opportunity a 
plaintiff has to seek relief from the court.105 This remedial tool is useful 
for a plaintiff to prevent future infringement and restore the exclusive 
rights that were originally guaranteed with the copyright.106 As such, 
preliminary injunctions play a crucial role in copyright litigation.107 
The presumption of irreparable harm developed concurrently in 
copyright infringement cases with its counterpart in patent infringement 
cases.108 If a plaintiff is able to make a prima facie case for copyright 
infringement, courts have presumed that the plaintiff would suffer 
irreparable harm.109 A copyright owner is guaranteed the exclusive right 
to use and distribute an original work.110 It follows that a copyright 
owner suffers harm by virtue of the loss of an exclusive right once this 
right has been invaded.111 This intangible injury has justified the basis 
for courts to recognize the presumption in copyright law.112 Essentially, 
courts rationalized the use of the presumption because “a claim of 
copyright infringement inherently means irreparable harm exists.”113 
Although this rationale does not apply with equal force in all copyright 
disputes, nearly all of the federal courts of appeal recognized this 
presumption of irreparable harm in copyright infringement claims.114 
                                                                                                                 
 104. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2012). 
 105. See id. § 502. 
 106. See Patry, supra note 30 and accompanying text (indicating the importance of 
preliminary injunctive relief in copyright infringement claims). 
 107. See Patry, supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 108. See Patry, supra note 30, § 22:44 (noting that all but the Fifth Circuit has 
applied the presumption). 
 109. See 17 U.S.C. § 502. 
 110. See id. § 106. 
 111. See Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 
1977), abrogated by eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006), as 
recognized in Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 74-75 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 112. See Patry, supra note 30, § 22:50 (“The rationale for the presumption is based 
on copyright’s intangible nature, a fact from which courts extrapolate that there is 
difficulty in establishing the financial impact of the alleged infringement.”). 
 113. See Patry, supra note 30 (noting that courts used circular reasoning to justify 
the use of the presumption). 
 114. See Patry, supra note 30, § 22:50 (“Certainly as a per se rule [the presumption] 
is false: innumerable copyright disputes are only about money.”). 
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II. eBAY AND THE DOWNFALL OF THE PRESUMPTION OF IRREPARABLE 
HARM 
The debate over the validity of the presumption of irreparable harm 
came to a head following the United States Supreme Court decisions in 
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. and Winter v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.115 These cases have led to the abolition of the 
presumption in patent infringement claims and copyright infringement 
claims.116 Consequently, there are now growing doubts as to the 
legitimacy of the presumption in false advertisement claims.117 Part II.A 
introduces eBay and Winter, the pivotal Supreme Court cases that 
review the standards for the equitable analysis for preliminary injunctive 
review. Part II.B examines the extension of eBay and Winter to 
preliminary injunctive review in patent infringement claims and 
copyright infringement claims. Part II.C then considers the debate over 
the applicability of eBay and Winter to preliminary injunctive review in 
false advertisement claims. 
A. THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR THE PRESUMPTION 
This section will introduce the Supreme Court decisions that 
prompted the beginning of the elimination of the presumption. 
1. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 
In 2006, the Supreme Court considered an appeal of the Federal 
Circuit’s grant of a permanent injunction in the patent infringement case 
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.118 MercExchange is a limited 
liability company that invents business method patents and assigns them 
for use by other businesses.119 MercExchange owned a business method 
patent for an electronic market that facilitated transactions between 
                                                                                                                 
 115. See Bernstein & Cerreta, supra note 47, at 27 (describing the debate over the 
continuing validity of the presumption of irreparable harm in intellectual property 
disputes following eBay and Winter). 
 116. See infra Part II.B (introducing the cases that first articulated the extension of 
eBay and Winter to patent infringement claims and copyright infringement claims). 
 117. See infra Part II.C (analyzing the two circuit court decisions that disagree over 
whether the presumption is still valid in false advertising claims). 
 118. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 119. See id. at 390. 
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private individuals.120 They entered into negotiations to license that 
patent to the popular online auction website eBay, and its wholly owned 
subsidiary Half.com.121 The companies were unable to reach an 
agreement.122 Subsequently, MercExchange believed that eBay and 
Half.com started using its patented invention and filed a patent 
infringement suit in the Eastern District of Virginia.123 A jury found in 
favor of MercExchange, determining that an award of damages was 
appropriate because eBay and Half.com had infringed upon 
MercExchange’s valid patent.124 MercExchange submitted a post-trial 
motion for permanent injunctive relief to prevent further infringement 
by eBay and Half.com, but the district court denied the motion after 
determining that the presumption was rebutted because irreparable harm 
will never result when a patent holder is “willing to license its patents” 
or has a “lack of commercial activity in practicing patents.”125 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the decision by applying 
“the general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against 
patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.”126 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to determine the appropriateness of this rule.127 
The Supreme Court determined that neither of the lower courts had 
properly applied the traditional principles of equity.128 In doing so, the 
Court held that a plaintiff must satisfy the four-factor test for permanent 
injunctions.129 The Court emphasized this rationale by indicating that “a 
                                                                                                                 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. at 390-91. 
 125. The court determined that the fact that MercExchange was willing to license its 
patent and was not going to commercially use the patent was conclusive evidence it 
would not suffer irreparable harm. See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. 
Supp.2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 126. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit did not see reason to depart from 
this general rule. The Federal Circuit did not believe exceptional circumstances were 
present that would allow for a departure. Without reference to the remaining factors, the 
court issued an injunction after finding in favor of the plaintiff on the first factor. See 
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 
547 U.S. 388, remanded to 188 Fed. App’x 993 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 127. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. 
 128. See id. at 390-94. 
 129. See id. In condemning categorical rules, the Court stated, “this Court has 
consistently rejected invitations to replace traditional equitable considerations with a 
rule that an injunction automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been 
infringed.” Id. at 392-93 (emphasis added). 
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major departure from the long tradition of equity practice should not be 
lightly implied.”130 As a result, the Court banned the use of “categorical 
rules” that result in the automatic issuance or denial of a permanent 
injunction in “patent disputes no less than in other cases governed by 
such standards.”131 
2. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 
In 2008, the Supreme Court considered the appeal of a preliminary 
injunction award in the environmental case Winter v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.132 Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) 
is an environmental action group that litigates against environmentally 
damaging activities.133 NRDC claimed that the U.S. Navy’s use of sonar 
in training exercises conducted in the water off of southern California 
was causing serious injuries to the thirty-seven species of marine 
mammals that lived in those waters in violation of the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969.134 NRDC filed suit against the Navy 
seeking an injunction to prohibit the use of sonar in future training 
exercises.135 The district court issued a preliminary injunction, and the 
court of appeals affirmed, holding that “when a plaintiff demonstrates a 
strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits, a preliminary injunction 
may be entered based only on a ‘possibility’ of irreparable harm.”136 The 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See id. at 391. 
 131. At trial, the district court had determined that the presumption of irreparable 
harm was rebutted because it found that the plaintiff’s uses of the patent made 
injunctive relief inappropriate. The Supreme Court discouraged the district court’s 
suggestion that injunctive relief should never issue under a “broad swath of cases.” 
However, the Court did not discuss the district court’s underlying use and recognition 
of the presumption of irreparable harm. The Court viewed the court of appeals’ 
elicitation of the general rule to grant permanent injunctions whenever a valid patent is 
infringed as a categorical rule. The Court found that these rules conflicted with the 
principles of equity requiring a plaintiff establish each factor of four-factor injunctive 
relief test. See id. at 393-94. 
 132. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
 133. See About, Natural Resources Defense Council, http://www.nrdc.org/about 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
 134. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 12-15. 
 135. See id. at 17. 
 136. The lower courts did not use a presumption of irreparable harm in the 
injunctive relief analysis, and the Supreme Court’s review was limited to whether the 
lower courts had placed a high enough burden on the plaintiff in establishing irreparable 
harm. See id. at 21. 
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Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the appropriateness of the 
preliminary injunction.137 The Court found that the “possibility” of 
irreparable harm as a standard was “too lenient,” and could lead to 
judicial speculation.138 The Court endorsed a stricter standard, requiring 
that injunctive relief “only be awarded upon a clear showing that the 
plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”139 Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
held that a plaintiff must establish that irreparable harm is “likely.”140 
The Court determined that regardless of the standard implemented, the 
determination of this factor was unnecessary as the other equities 
weighed in favor of denying the motion.141 
B. THE END OF THE PRESUMPTION IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS AND 
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS 
The Supreme Court did not expressly address the validity of the 
presumption of the irreparable harm in either of its decisions.142 
Furthermore, eBay concerned a permanent injunction in a patent dispute 
while Winter involved a preliminary injunction in an environmental 
dispute.143 This caused courts hearing motions for preliminary 
injunctions in patent infringement claims and copyright infringement 
claims to struggle over whether the Supreme Court’s reasoning in these 
cases extended to the applicability of the presumption.144 This section 
                                                                                                                 
 137. See id. at 20. 
 138. See id. at 22. 
 139. A clear showing here requires that the plaintiff show not just that irreparable 
harm is possible, but that it is likely. See id. 
 140. See id. 
 141. In discussing the injury, the Court indicated that the naval activities did not 
present unknown effects on the environment because the activities had been taking 
place for the past forty years. Furthermore, the Court indicated that there was no 
documented episode of injury to the marine mammals. The “possibility” standard 
would allow for remote or suspect injuries, such as these, to satisfy the burden. See id. 
at 22-24, 33. 
 142. See id. at 20-22; eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393-94 
(2006). 
 143. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 12; eBay, 547 U.S. at 390-91. 
 144. “It remains an open question ‘whether there remains a rebuttable presumption 
of irreparable harm following eBay’[.]” See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 
F.3d 683, 702 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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explores the cases that have extended the rationale of these Supreme 
Court decisions so as to abolish the presumption.145 
1. Salinger v. Colting 
In 2010, the Second Circuit affirmatively stated that the rationales 
of eBay and Winter extended to copyright infringement claims in 
Salinger v. Colting.146 J.D. Salinger, author of the famous The Catcher 
in the Rye (“Catcher”), has never permitted adaptations of his works.147 
Frederik Colting wrote 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye, a 
story about Holden Caulfield, Salinger’s main character, sixty years 
after the events of Catcher.148 Consequently, Salinger initiated legal 
action against Colting for copyright infringement and sought a 
preliminary injunction.149 The district court granted the motion.150 In 
doing so, it determined that Salinger had presented a prima facie case of 
copyright infringement that permitted a presumption of irreparable 
harm.151 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court’s 
decision holding that the rationale in eBay “applies with equal force to 
(a) preliminary injunctions (b) that are issued for alleged copyright 
infringement.”152 The court bridged the gap between permanent 
injunctions and preliminary injunctions through Winter, stating that its 
rationale reinforced the applicability of eBay.153 The court reasoned that 
the eBay opinion did not limit its application strictly to patent contexts 
                                                                                                                 
 145. For patent infringement claims, the Federal Circuit is the only appellate court 
with jurisdiction to hear patent claims, therefore Robert Bosch necessarily becomes 
binding precedent in all preliminary injunctive cases in the patent context. See Robert 
Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1148-49 (Fed. Cir. 2011). For 
copyright infringement claims, Salinger is the first circuit court to extend the rationale 
in eBay. See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 146. See Salinger, 607 F.3d 68. 
 147. See id. at 71. 
 148. See id. at 71-72. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id at 74. 
 151. See id. (noting that the district court recognized the prevalence of eBay, but 
determined that because it had yet to be extended to copyright cases in the Second 
Circuit, the presumption was valid). 
 152. The court engages in a discussion about the relevance of earlier Supreme Court 
cases that indicate that the Supreme Court did not view patent and copyright 
infringements “as different in kind.” See id. at 77-78. 
 153. See id. at 78. 
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and that the traditional principles of equity apply in any context.154 
Therefore, the court endorsed its view that the presumption fell outside 
of the traditional principles of equity for copyright infringement claims 
and it has since been abolished in the Second Circuit in this context.155 
2. Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corp. 
In 2011, the Federal Circuit eliminated the use of the presumption 
in patent infringement claims in Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon 
Manufacturing Corp.156 Robert Bosch, LLC (“Bosch”) holds patents for 
different aspects of windshield wiper technology.157 Pylon 
Manufacturing Corporation (“Pylon”) is a competitor of Bosch that sold 
similar windshield wipers.158 Bosch filed suit in the district court for the 
District of Delaware alleging patent infringement because of Pylon’s 
commercial activities.159 A jury found in favor of Bosch after 
determining that Pylon had infringed upon the valid patents of Bosch.160 
Bosch subsequently filed a motion for permanent injunctive relief, 
however the court held that Bosch did not satisfy the burden of 
establishing irreparable harm.161 On appeal, the Federal Circuit 
considered the impact of eBay on the presumption in determining 
whether an injunction should be issued in patent infringement claims.162 
The Federal Circuit determined that “eBay jettisoned the presumption of 
irreparable harm as it applies to determining the appropriateness of 
injunctive relief.”163 Accordingly, Bosch established a precedent in not 
recognizing a presumption in patent infringement claims.164 
                                                                                                                 
 154. See id. at 77-78. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1148-49 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011). 
 157. See id. at 1145. 
 158. See id. 
 159. See id. 
 160. See id. 
 161. The district court referenced the presumption of irreparable harm and eBay, but 
did not go into detail on why the presumption was no longer available to a plaintiff 
seeking an injunction. See Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 748 F. Supp.2d 
383, 407 (D. Del. 2010), rev’d, 659 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 162. See Robert Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1148-50. 
 163. See id. at 1149. 
 164. This holding is now binding precedent in all patent infringement claims. See 
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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C. THE END OF THE PRESUMPTION IN FALSE ADVERTISEMENT CLAIMS? 
The circuit courts have not agreed on whether the presumption of 
irreparable harm in false advertisement cases survives the decisions of 
eBay and Winter.165 This section will introduce the debate regarding the 
validity of the continued recognition of the presumption of irreparable 
harm.166 
1. Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. 
In 2007, the Second Circuit considered the validity of the 
presumption in Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc.167 The case 
involved two of the giants in the multichannel service industry, Time 
Warner Cable (“TWC”) and DIRECTV.168 TWC, as a cable provider, 
must receive a franchise from a local government before it can operate 
in that locale.169 DIRECTV, on the other hand, is not similarly restricted 
because it broadcasts directly via satellite.170 Because of this market 
structure, satellite providers undeniably become direct competitors with 
cable providers.171 DIRECTV began an advertising campaign that did 
not mention any cable provider by name, but instead made claims about 
                                                                                                                 
 165. The abolition of the presumption of irreparable harm in patent infringement 
claims was foreseeable insofar as eBay is in fact a patent case itself. The similarities 
between the underlying claims in eBay and Bosch make the jump a small one. 
Moreover the leap to copyright in Salinger is logical given the similarities between 
patent and copyright laws. Alternatively, while the presumption that is applied in false 
advertising cases is the same as that which was abolished in Bosch and Salinger, the 
underlying claim is not the same as eBay. This has caused conflict between and trouble 
for the circuit courts that have had the opportunity to review preliminary injunctions 
against false advertising. See infra Part II.C. 
 166. See Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 
2014); Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 161-62                  
(2d Cir. 2007). 
 167. Time Warner, 497 F.3d at 144. 
 168. See id. at 148 
 169. TWC owned a franchise in the greater part of New York City. See id.              
at 148-49. 
 170. See id. at 149. 
 171. The franchise gives TWC a pseudo-monopoly, which means that it is the main 
cable provider in a given locality. TWC’s pseudo-monopoly restricts all other cable 
competitors, but it does not restrict satellite providers. Therefore, as a matter of fact, the 
fiercest competitor a cable company that has a franchise will face is a satellite provider 
that can overstep the privileges that come with that franchise. See id. 
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DIRECTV’s superior picture quality to “cable” in general.172 TWC filed 
suit alleging that DIRECTV’s campaign constituted false advertising in 
violation of section 43(a) because the campaign misled consumers into 
believing that DIRECTV actually had superior quality, when in fact 
there was no difference.173 TWC subsequently filed a motion for a 
preliminary injunction against DIRECTV’s campaign.174 In affirming 
the district court’s grant of the motion, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit reiterated the validity of the presumption “where the case 
presents a false comparative advertising claim [because] ‘the      
concerns . . . regarding speculative injury do not arise.’” 175 However, 
the court endorsed an expanded view of the presumption, recognizing it 
both where the advertisement expressly mentions a competitor’s name 
and where it does not mention the competitor by name, but consumers 
would understand the advertisement as referring to that competitor.176 In 
doing so, the Second Circuit took the opportunity to reiterate why the 
principles underlying the presumption apply equally in both instances; 
                                                                                                                 
 172. DIRECTV’s advertising campaign consisted of three different advertisements: 
a commercial starring Jessica Simpson, a commercial starring William Shatner, and 
internet advertisements, all of which compared the quality of its own services to cable 
in general. See id. at 149-51. 
 173. Although the advertisements all stated this in one way or another, the most 
egregious example came at the conclusion of the commercials where a voice-over 
stated, “[f]or picture quality that beats cable, you’ve got to get DIRECTV.” Although 
they were subsequently revised, the commercial still implied an essence of superiority 
over cable. See id. at 150. 
 174. Before the motion was filed, the companies entered into negotiations, which 
resulted in a stipulation wherein DIRECTV agreed to halt any transmission of its 
original advertisements, among other things. They subsequently created revised 
advertisements that led to TWC seeking the preliminary injunction. See id. at 151. 
 175. In reviewing the motion, the district court determined that TWC had 
established the first factor requiring that the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits 
of the case, and turned to the irreparable harm prong. The court reiterated the precedent 
of the Second Circuit and the underlying rationale for the presumption. See id. at 162 
(quoting McNeilab, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 848 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1988)). 
 176. Although the court noted that irreparable harm couldn’t be presumed when the 
defendant is not mentioned by name, it ruled that the presumption of irreparable harm 
applied in this scenario because TWC was essentially synonymous with “cable” in the 
markets where it was the franchisee. Therefore, even though they were not mentioned 
by name, consumers in those markets would understand the advertisements to be about 
TWC. See id. Alternatively, the court recognized that when a false advertisement does 
not expressly or impliedly reference a competitor’s product, it would not have the 
diminishing effect that a comparative advertisement inflicts, thereby making the 
presumption speculative. See id. 
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namely that the presumption causes little concern over speculative 
injury because “a false ‘comparison to a specific competing product 
necessarily diminishes that product’s value in the minds of the 
consumer,’” when the consumer recognizes the advertisement to refer to 
a competitor.177 The court did not discuss the effect eBay or Winter 
might have on the presumption.178 Ultimately, the court granted TWC 
the preliminary injunction against DIRECTV’s advertising campaign.179 
The reasoning in Time Warner has survived Salinger, and it has guided 
the court in continuing to recognize the presumption of irreparable harm 
in false advertising claims.180 
2. Ferring Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
In 2014, the Third Circuit received its opportunity to answer the 
question of whether the presumption continues to exist in Ferring 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.181 The case 
involved Ferring Pharmaceuticals (Ferring) and Watson 
Pharmaceuticals. (Watson), two competing pharmaceutical companies 
that manufacture competing progesterone products, hormonal drugs that 
help women become pregnant and maintain their pregnancies.182 
Ferring’s product, Endometrin, and Watson’s product, Crinone, are the 
only U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approved vaginal 
progesterone inserts.183 Before the dispute, Watson hosted an 
invitational event where it paid consultant Dr. Kaylen M. Silverberg to 
deliver two presentations to medical professional invitees during which 
                                                                                                                 
 177. Since a false comparison will necessarily lead consumers to take a different 
view of the product then before they had seen the advertisement, no proof of injury is 
necessary. See id. 
 178. See id. 
 179. See id. 
 180. See Merck Eprova AG v. Gnosis S.p.A., 760 F.3d 247, 259-61 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(holding that the presumption applied when the competitor is expressly mentioned in 
the advertisement and when the competitor is not expressly mentioned, but the 
advertiser and competitor operate in a two-player market). 
 181. See Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 212-14 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
 182. See id. at 206. 
 183. Endometrin is delivered in capsule form, whereas Crinone is a gel delivered via 
applicator. See id. at 207. 
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he made statements regarding both Endometrin and Crinone.184 Ferring 
subsequently filed suit alleging that the statements constituted false 
advertisements in violation of section 43(a) because the statements 
mislead medical professionals about the efficacy, reputation and risks of 
their product.185 Ferring submitted a motion for a preliminary injunction 
to enjoin Watson from further statements and for corrective 
advertising.186 The district court denied the motion, refusing to entitle 
Ferring to the presumption of irreparable harm.187 On appeal, the Third 
Circuit was faced with a case of first impression, as it had never before 
awarded a plaintiff a presumption of irreparable harm when reviewing a 
motion for a preliminary injunction.188 The court’s opinion was guided 
by the principles of eBay, Winter, and Salinger.189 The court utilized 
Salinger as a vehicle to rationalize the extension of eBay to false 
advertisement claims.190 In an attempt to rebut this extension, Ferring 
highlighted an inherent distinction between patent or copyright 
                                                                                                                 
 184. Medical professionals who were given an access password were also able to 
view the presentations online. See id. at 207. Ferring was concerned with three of Dr. 
Silverberg’s statements: (1) his statements after referencing to a “Black Box” warning 
which indicates to the medical community that a product carries significant risk of 
serious or life-threatening effects; (2) his statements after referencing to a patient 
preference survey indicating that patients overwhelmingly preferred Crinone over 
Endometrin; and (3) his statements after referencing to studies of Endometrin’s efficacy 
for women over the age of thirty-five. See id. Dr. Silverberg subsequently 
acknowledged that the statements when referring to these three items were incorrect 
with regard to what the items actually stated. See id. at 206-10. 
 185. See id. at 207. 
 186. See Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., No. 12-cv-05824 
(DMC)(JAD), 2013 WL 1405226 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2013). 
 187. After refusing to recognize the presumption, the district court found that 
Ferring did not allege enough facts sufficient to show that it would suffer harm. See id. 
at *4. 
 188. The court acknowledged that other circuits had previously recognized the 
presumption for false advertisement claims, and that it had recognized the presumption 
for trademark infringement claims. See Ferring, 765 F.3d at 210. 
 189. Of importance here is that the Second Circuit issued its decision in Time 
Warner Cable three years prior to its in Salinger decision. The court in Salinger did not 
review the standard stated in Time Warner Cable because neither the parties nor the 
district court raised the issue. See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77 n.6 (2010). The 
Second Circuit subsequently endorsed the Time Warner Standard for false comparative 
advertising claims in Merck. See Merck Eprova AG v. Gnosis S.p.A., 760 F.3d 247, 
259-61 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 190. The court used Salinger to indicate that eBay is not strictly limited to the patent 
context, thereby allowing for its extension to the false advertising context. See Ferring, 
765 F.3d. at 213-14. 
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infringement and false advertising: “the injury arising from patent or 
copyright infringement can generally be measured in monetary terms . . . 
[while] injury to goodwill and reputation [arising from false advertising] 
‘is real but difficult to measure in dollars and cents.’”191 However, the 
court was not persuaded by this argument, indicating that the rationale in 
eBay and Winter is focused on the proper framework for injunctive 
relief, and not the underlying claim.192 Thus, the Third Circuit declined 
to recognize the presumption of irreparable harm for false advertisement 
claims.193 In turn, the court imposed on Ferring the burden of 
demonstrating a likelihood of irreparable harm if the injunction were not 
granted.194 The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the 
motion after determining that the evidence Ferring produced was too 
speculative to overcome the burden.195 This case represents not only a 
stark contrast to the holding in Time Warner Cable, but also the first 
                                                                                                                 
 191. See id. at 215 (quoting 5 J. Thomas McCarthy, supra note 28, § 30:47); see 
generally supra Part I (discussing the similarities between patent and copyright 
infringement claims). 
 192. The court opined that the rationale in eBay was not unique to patent cases, and 
rather that injunctive relief must be granted in accordance with the traditional principles 
of equity. The court bolstered its opinion with the line of reasoning seen in Winter. The 
court gave little, if any, weight to Ferring’s argument. See Ferring, 765 F.3d at 215-17 
(disagreeing with Ferring’s argument that eBay does not apply to Lanham Act cases 
because the court believed that the unique characteristics of patents did not factor into 
the ultimate holding and using Winter to reinforce this conclusion). 
 193. See id. at 217. 
 194. See id. 
 195. Ferring submitted a declaration from Dr. Angeline N. Beltsos that stated: “(1) 
Dr. Beltsos and other doctors would be less likely to prescribe a drug if they believed it 
contained a Black Box warning; (2) Dr. Beltsos and other doctors would be less likely 
to prescribe a drug if patients in the marketplace generally preferred another drug; and 
(3) Dr. Beltsos and other doctors would be less likely to prescribe a drug if it was not 
effective for a particular age group.” Id. at 217. The court found this declaration to be 
speculative because she stated that these types of statements “may influence” her 
professional decisions, and, moreover, nothing in the declaration indicated that she had 
changed her prescription rate of Endometrin. See id. at 218-19. Furthermore, the court 
gave significant weight to Dr. Silverberg’s certifications that he would refrain from 
making the offending statements in the future and that no evidence was produced to 
support the fact that the statements were still available, or would later be made 
available, in the marketplace, notwithstanding the fact that Watson itself had not 
certified that it would refrain from making any of these statements in the future. See id. 
at 217-18. 
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extension of eBay by a circuit court to abolish the use of the 
presumption in a false advertisement claim.196 
III. LONG LIVE THE PRESUMPTION OF IRREPARABLE HARM 
Part II introduced the debate about whether the presumption of 
irreparable harm should continue to exist in false advertisement cases in 
the wake of eBay and Winter. Part III argues that it should continue to 
be recognized where a false comparative advertisement is at issue. Part 
III.A discusses why the presumption in false advertisement cases is 
consistent with eBay and Winter. Part III.B examines the market 
interests in a false advertisement case that ground the presumption in 
sound policy. Part III.C will then argue that the presumption applied by 
the Second Circuit in Time Warner Cable is properly designed to 
address the interests of the Lanham Act while operating within the 
equitable framework endorsed by the Supreme Court. 
A. THE PRESUMPTION OF IRREPARABLE HARM IS CONSISTENT WITH eBAY 
AND WINTER 
The presumption in false comparative advertisement cases can 
continue to be recognized because it is consistent with the holding in 
eBay.197 In eBay, the Court forbade the use of a categorical rule that 
would override the four-factor equitable analysis and result in an 
automatic denial or issuance of an injunction.198 The presumption does 
not operate as a categorical rule during either the individual 
determination of irreparable harm or in the resulting outcome of the 
analysis.199 When determining whether irreparable harm has resulted, 
the presumption is rebuttable, thereby allowing the defendant to defeat it 
by offering counter evidence.200 Thus, the presumption standing alone 
                                                                                                                 
 196. See id. at 214. Contra Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 
144, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2007) (offering an opposing view to the continued recognition of 
the presumption of irreparable harm in the limited context of comparative false 
advertising claims). 
 197. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (explaining that the presumption 
operates within the equitable framework as opposed to overriding it, which is at the core 
of the argument in favor of recognizing that the presumption is consistent with eBay). 
 198. See supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text (analyzing the Supreme 
Court’s disagreement with the lower courts’ holdings, which involved elements that 
were contradictory to the traditional principles of equity). 
 199. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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does not result in an automatic determination because the rebuttal option 
serves as a safeguard.201 In turn, the presumption must be fairly balanced 
against an examination of the other factors of the equitable analysis.202 A 
categorical rule would override this analysis resulting in an absolute 
outcome dependent on one factor.203 The presumption merely governs 
the second factor of the analysis, allowing for the four-factor test to be 
the final referee.204 As a result, the presumption does not parallel a 
categorical rule.205 The fact that eBay does not criticize the district 
court’s underlying use of the presumption reinforces this view.206 It 
follows that presumptions that operate within the equitable analysis 
framework are not a departure from the traditional principles of 
equity.207 Thus, the presumption is an appropriate tool that can be used 
within the framework set out in eBay.208 
Likewise, the Supreme Court’s holding in Winter does not threaten 
the presumption’s legitimacy.209 Winter held that a plaintiff’s burden of 
establishing the “possibility” of irreparable harm was too lenient and 
that the plaintiff must satisfy the burden by showing that it is “likely.”210 
This decision does not reinforce an extension of eBay or stand in its 
shoes to accomplish the same result because the Court did not determine 
                                                                                                                 
 201. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 202. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 203. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
 205. Compare supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (indicating that the 
presumption does not foreclose the potential for a defendant to defeat a motion for a 
preliminary injunction), with supra notes 125-26, 129-31 and accompanying text 
(detailing the rules that the Supreme Court deemed to be categorical, which had 
resulted in automatic outcomes on the motion for a preliminary injunction in both of the 
lower courts). 
 206. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (highlighting the fact that the 
Supreme Court did not discuss the district court’s underlying use of the presumption, 
but rather its suggestion that injunctive relief would never be appropriate under certain 
circumstances). 
 207. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text (analyzing the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Winter that for a plaintiff to be entitled to relief they have the burden of 
proving the likelihood of irreparable harm). 
 210. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text. 
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that the presumption itself was “too lenient.”211 Instead, Winter 
expressly speaks to the burden of establishing irreparable harm, not to a 
presumptive tool that shifts that burden.212 The distinction of the 
presumption from the domain of Winter is bolstered by the Court’s 
desire to prevent future courts from granting an injunction on 
speculative facts.213 The presumption does not give rise to judicial 
speculation because irreparable harm necessarily results from a false 
comparative advertisement.214 In light of this, it can be said that the 
injury is not only likely, but it is certain.215 Therefore, the presumption is 
consistent with Winter because it is not a speculative burden 
requirement itself, but rather a burden shifting mechanism based on 
established norms.216 
B. POLICY REASONS FOR CONTINUED RECOGNITION 
The market interests that false advertising law is designed to protect 
provide sound policy reasons for the continued recognition of the 
presumption in false comparative advertisement claims. On the other 
hand, patent law and copyright law lack the necessary market interests 
to justify its future use. 
False advertisement law does not seek an equal balance of market 
interests.217 The Lanham Act’s goal of protecting the market by 
promoting a truthful one pushes in favor of a presumption that would 
                                                                                                                 
 211. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting that the presumption was 
not up for review by the Supreme Court and the ruling was limited to the proper 
standard for the burden of proof for preliminary injunctions). 
 212. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (indicating that the Supreme Court 
seemed to have concerns regarding the issuance of a preliminary injunction based on an 
improperly low burden for establishing irreparable harm). 
 214. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (analyzing the reason why false 
comparative advertisements provide a unique legal landscape in which the presumption 
can operate without speculation). 
 215. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text. 
 216. Compare supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (indicating that the 
presumption is merely a burden-shifting mechanism), with supra notes 136-40 and 
accompanying text (describing the issue before the Supreme Court in Winter and how 
the decision is directed at preventing the issuance of a speculative preliminary 
injunction by increasing the threshold level for establishing irreparable harm, a question 
very different from whether a burden-shifting mechanism is valid). 
 217. See supra notes 39-49 (indicating that the Lanham Act has the fundamental 
purpose of protecting the interests of the targeted company and the injured consumer 
compared to those who decide to violate its mandates). 
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give assistance to a party with interests aligned with that goal.218 Two 
factors emphasize the difficulty in supporting these interests in the 
absence of the presumption. First, the harm from a false comparative 
advertisement necessarily results whenever the false message is 
conveyed to consumers.219 The presumption should not violate any sense 
of equity because it presumes an injury that can legitimately be 
presumed.220 Second, without access to the presumption, a plaintiff is 
faced with the notoriously difficult burden of establishing an injury from 
false advertising.221 A company would be so limited in its ability to 
prove this and succeed in its pursuit of a preliminary injunction that the 
market would be forced to endure the perpetuation of false perceptions 
until the conclusion of trial thereby increasing the costs imposed upon 
the market.222 Given that the injury to the market occurs every time the 
false message is conveyed to a consumer, this result is so contrary to the 
policies underlying false advertisement law that it should violate a sense 
of equity.223 Therefore, if the market interests are to be duly supported, 
the recognition of the presumption will provide the first line of defense 
in guarding those interests in a fashion that still operates within the 
equitable framework.224 
Patent law and copyright law are both concerned with a much more 
equitable division of interests.225 Accordingly, a court must actively seek 
an equal playing field between the parties when determining whether to 
grant a preliminary injunction lest it set off that balance.226 Presuming 
irreparable harm in these contexts would unwarrantedly tip the scales in 
favor of the plaintiff.227 
                                                                                                                 
 218. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text. 
 221. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (describing the almost 
insurmountable burden that a plaintiff must overcome to establish irreparable harm 
resulting from false comparative advertisements at such an early stage in litigation). 
 222. See supra notes 52-55 (describing that the heightened burden is bad for the 
market because both the plaintiff and consumers will be subject to the false 
advertisement if the plaintiff cannot overcome that burden). 
 223. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text. 
 224. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text. 
 225. For an analysis of the interests underlying patent law, see supra notes 76-82 
and accompanying text. For a similar analysis in copyright law, see supra notes 98-103 
and accompanying text. 
 226. See supra notes 76-82, 98-103 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra notes 76-82, 98-103 and accompanying text. 
2015] KEEPING THE STATUS QUO 965 
In the patent context, the elimination of the presumption is aligned 
with a legal regime that supports an equal balance of interests.228 Two 
factors justify its elimination. First, the existence of a patent 
infringement claim is not determinative evidence that the patent holder 
has suffered irreparable harm.229 The use of the presumption would 
afford an unwarranted advantage to the plaintiff.230 Second, this 
advantage would be conferred in a context where the underlying 
interests seek a fair balance between the parties.231 The presumption 
would redistribute the weight afforded to the underlying interests of 
patent law, giving undue protection to the patent holder thereby 
offsetting the balance of interests.232 The abolition of the presumption 
instead restores the desired fairness aligned with the balance that patent 
law is intended to promote.233 
The abolition of the presumption in copyright infringement is an 
easy jump from patent infringement given the similarities between the 
two fields.234 Two analogous factors underscore the justification for 
prohibiting the presumption in this context. First, because of the variety 
of uses of a copyright, the existence of an infringement claim is not 
always dispositive evidence of irreparable injury.235 The diverging uses 
of a copyright restrict the acceptance of a presumption that would 
assume injury regardless of the use.236 Second, the interests underlying 
copyright law support a position in favor of requiring the moving party 
to establish irreparable harm.237 A presumption would impede the 
accomplishment of copyright law’s desire for an equal balance of 
                                                                                                                 
 228. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (describing the equal balance 
between affording protection to inventors who have expended effort in the pursuit of 
innovation and increasing public access to that innovation). 
 229. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (explaining that a plaintiff can be 
made whole when the litigation concerns a matter where the defendant has committed 
past infringement, and that future infringement is the limited space where patent 
infringement could be irreparable). 
 230. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text. 
 233. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text (describing the equal balance of 
interests that copyright law has been designed to promote). 
 235. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (noting that there are many 
copyright disputes that are simply about money, which would foreclose the possibility 
of irreparable harm). 
 236. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text. 
 237. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text. 
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interests because it would shift the initial fairness of the litigation in 
favor of the plaintiff.238 Without the presumption, the interests will be 
appropriately weighed against each other allowing copyright law to 
promote its goals in the complementary fashion that the law intends.239 
Accordingly, the presumption is an unnecessary tool to achieve the 
goals of the Patent Act and the Copyright Act, unlike its indispensability 
to the achievement of the goals of the Lanham Act. 
C. THE STANDARD TO BE RECOGNIZED BY COURTS GOING FORWARD 
The presumption that most dutifully protects the market interests in 
a false advertisement claim without violating eBay or Winter is the 
standard employed by the Second Circuit.240 Recognition of the 
presumption in all false advertisement cases has been advocated in a few 
courts and has scholarly recognition, yet blanket recognition is not 
feasible.241 Presuming that any time there is a false advertisement, there 
is a corresponding injury would operate as a highly speculative tool that 
doubles as a categorical rule.242 Alternatively, a plaintiff should be 
entitled to a rebuttable presumption within the equitable framework 
limited to the two categories identified by the Second Circuit.243 The 
first category results from an advertiser broadcasting a message that 
contains an express comparison to a competitor.244 The second category 
occurs when the advertiser does not expressly mention the competitor, 
but the market is structured in such a way that a consumer would 
                                                                                                                 
 238. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text. 
 240. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text (analyzing the rule set forth by 
the Second Circuit). 
 241. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining the disagreement that has 
been seen in courts regarding the correct scope of the presumption of irreparable harm 
between whether it should be limited to false comparative advertising claims or whether 
it is appropriate to use it in all false advertising claims). 
 242. See supra notes 126-31, 136-41 and accompanying text (analyzing the rules at 
issue in eBay and Winter that gave rise to the concerns over the validity of the 
presumption and whether its use is consistent with the decisions). 
 243. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (describing the two areas in which 
the Second Circuit has approved the continued use of the presumption). Although the 
Second Circuit expressed doubt about the presumption in Salinger, the court 
subsequently reaffirmed the framework set out by Time Warner in Merck for false 
comparative advertisement claims. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
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reasonably believe the message to be about that competitor.245 The 
rationale for the presumption under the first category applies with equal 
force to the other because a competitor’s goodwill and reputation will 
necessarily be damaged whenever a consumer recognizes that the 
advertisement is a comparison between the two companies.246 As a 
result, a court can effectively use the presumption under this framework 
to alleviate the foregoing concerns of the balance of interests in a false 
comparative advertisement claim while staying within the realm of eBay 
and Winter.247 
CONCLUSION 
The continued recognition of a rebuttable presumption of 
irreparable harm is the next challenge facing courts hearing false 
advertisement claims. This Note introduced the related areas of patent 
law and copyright law that have seen the abolition of the presumption in 
the wake of eBay and Winter. Abolishing it in false advertisement 
claims for the same reasons is not only wholly unnecessary, but would 
render immaterial the very policies that ground the law. In upcoming 
decisions, courts should continue to recognize the presumption in false 
comparative advertisement claims when the advertisement expressly 
identifies the plaintiff, or when it is clear that a reasonable consumer 
would infer the advertisement to be targeted at the plaintiff. Limiting the 
use of the presumption to these two areas will ensure that it promotes 
the welfare of the market interests in a manner that fully complies with 
the framework endorsed by eBay and Winter. A preliminary injunction 
remains the essential remedy for both the company and the consumer, 
and the presumption used in this fashion will ensure that the preliminary 
injunction does not become obsolete in false advertising. 
                                                                                                                 
 245. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra notes 197-216 and accompanying text (explaining why the use of the 
presumption of irreparable harm is consistent with eBay and Winter). 
